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DEFINING THE RIGHT INTERNAL EXCHANGE RATE
European economies need to adjust to a sustainable growth path. That
implies adjusting internal exchange rates. Since the start of the Great Recession,
euro area crisis countries (and more specifically Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy,
Ireland) have engaged in austerity policies in order to slash public deficits, but also
in attempt to regain lost competitiveness. These policies, by weighing on internal
demand and growth, have successively pushed euro area countries into competi-
tive disinflation policies. This non-cooperative game, whose goal is to win market
shares against euro area partners by improving the country’s price-competitive-
ness, has already had sharp disinflationary effects and runs the risk of pushing
the euro area economy into deflation, a threat already identified in last year’s
iAGS report. 
Wage deflation is producing adjustment but at a high social cost, and there is a
serious risk of overshooting. Defining the appropriate target is thus critical. In this
chapter, we attempt to define adjustment targets for euro area countries. To do so,
we compute the variation of the general price level of each country compatible
with a stable and sustainable international investment position, that is the balance
between a country’s foreign assets and liabilities. We take into account the fact that
economies have not yet recovered from the crisis as this influences long-run trade
balances. The simulations also include the simultaneous determination of import
and export prices, which determines the final real effective exchange rate of each
country endogenously. They rely on recent econometric estimates of trade elastici-
ties (see Ducoudré and Heyer, 2014). 
This chapter is a first attempt at calibrating a cooperative and coordinated
price/wage policy in the euro area in a unified framework. Even though a substan-
tial readjustment has been achieved since 2011, much still remains to be done.
A rebalancing strategy should rely on maintaining inflation differentials within the
euro area over an extended period, with higher inflation in Germany and lower
inflation in crisis countries; deflation is not required in the latter countries if the
readjustment is implemented gradually. A nominal depreciation of the Euro would
facilitate the rebalancing by making it compatible with a higher inflation rate.
Deleveraging in some countries would also ease the adjustment.
The chapter is organised as follows. The first part studies the external imbal-
ances of the euro area countries, by looking at structural trade balances. It
emphasises the role of wage deflation in the effective exchange rate adjustments
that occurred since 2008 as a way to correct external imbalances. The second part
briefly presents the model, and discusses the simulation results.
1. External imbalances adjustments since 2008
To assess the need for adjusting to internal exchange rates, we start the
analysis by looking at current trade balances in euro area (EA thereafter) countries.
Next we point to the adjustments already achieved in EA countries. To do so, we
carefully look at labour costs, relative prices and trade flow variations since 2008.
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External disequilibrium in euro area countries
Since the start of the 2008 crisis, the current account of the euro area has
strongly increased, starting from a current account deficit of -1% of GDP in 2008,
to a surplus of +3% of GDP in 2013 (Figure 1). This apparent improvement mainly
comes from the harsh reduction of current account deficits in southern countries:
Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal. A tentative analysis would stop here and
conclude that external imbalances have been corrected, France being the last
country needing to correct this. However, high unemployment and depressed
internal demand account for an important part of the adjustment. Austerity poli-
cies weigh on internal demand and imports, explaining a substantial part of the
improving trade balances. On the other side, the shrinkage of exports due to
trade partners' internal demand collapse worsens the trade balance. Moreover,
these current account surpluses, once business cycle effects are taken into
account, may not be compatible with sustainable trajectories of international
investment positions.
Starting from these remarks, we try to assess current external disequilibria in EA
countries taking into account the fact that these countries and the world economy
have not yet recovered from the crisis. The external disequilibrium of a country can
be assessed by computing the gap between the structural trade balance (the trade
balance obtained when output gaps are closed—STB thereafter, see Box 1 for
computation details) and the trade balance that stabilizes the net international
investment position (NIIP thereafter) at a desired level expressed as a % of GDP1.
The structural trade balance of a country depends on the output gap of the
economy: a negative output gap signals a weak internal demand that diminishes
Figure 1. Current accounts developments in the euro area since 2000
 In % of EA GDP
Source: Eurostat.
1. Clearly, given that a negative NIIP (normally) implies an outflow of interest, dividend and other
payments, which burden the current account, a persistent rise in the NIIP is not sustainable.
Although the constraints are not as binding in the case of surpluses, it is usually inadvisable to pile
up increasing net foreign assets as this creates imbalances that can lead to capital losses.
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imports. Closing the output gap would then worsen the trade balance of that
country. The structural trade balance also depends on the output gaps of trade
partners: if they face a negative output gap, they import less from the country.
Closing their output gap would then improve the trade balance of the country.
In Table 1 we report the STB for eleven EA countries. STB are generally lower
than current trade balances, since almost all EA countries face a more negative
output gap than that of their partners. Greece, the most extreme case, has an
actual trade balance near to 0 in 2013 (-0.2% of GDP), but its STB amounts to -
11.4% of GDP due to its strongly negative output gap (-13.3% of GDP). On the
contrary, Germany has a STB (8.3% of GDP) higher than its trade balance (6.2%
of GDP) in 2013, since its output gap is nearly closed while the one of its main
trading partners is on average larger. 
We also report the STB target, i.e. the STB compatible with a stable NIIP. It is
computed as the current NIIP adjusted by the gap between the potential growth
rate and the long run real interest rate, and corrected for the gap between the
current account and the trade balance. Defining the target of the external adjust-
ment of EA countries is a critical task. It is clear that an ever increasing or
decreasing external position is not sustainable in the long run. Stabilizing the NIIP
is therefore a necessary condition, but the level at which that position becomes
unsustainable is not clearly quantified in the literature. In this part, for sake of
simplicity we stabilise the NIIP in the long run at its current level. In the second part
of the chapter, we define different constraints on long run NIIPs.
Table 1. Trade balance gap for 11 euro area countries in 2013
% of GDP
Net interna-
tional 
investment 
position
Current 
account
Trade 
balance
Output 
gap
(%)
Potential 
growth
(%)
Weighted 
output gap 
of trade 
partners
(%)
Structural 
trade 
balance
Structural 
trade 
balance 
target*
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) = (3) – (6) + (4)
(8) = 
[(5) – r] x (1) 
– [(2) – (3)]
AUT 1 2.7 3.7 -2.9 1.5 -2.0 2.8 1.0
BEL 46 -1.9 -0.1 -1.9 2.0 -2.7 0.7 2.2
FIN 16 -1.1 0.3 -3.1 2.0 -2.0 -0.8 1.5
FRA -17 -1.3 -1.3 -2.9 1.7 -2.5 -1.7 0.0
DEU 48 7.5 6.2 -0.6 1.1 -2.6 8.3 -1.2
GRC -121 0.7 -0.2 -13.3 1.5 -2.1 -11.4 -1.5
IRL -105 6.6 23.3 -8.7 2.0 -2.4 17.0 15.6
ITA -30 1.0 2.6 -5.6 0.9 -2.2 -0.8 1.6
NLD 46 10.9 10.6 -4.3 1.8 -2.2 8.5 0.1
PRT -119 0.5 1.7 -7.2 1.6 -3.0 -2.6 0.5
ESP -98 0.8 2.9 -5.3 1.7 -2.8 0.3 1.3
* The structural trade balance target is the structural trade balance that is compatible with NIIP stability at its 
2013 level. We assume that the gap between the current account and the trade balance (revenues and current 
transfers) is constant. We assume r = 1%.
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook 95, IMF WEO October 2014, Oxford Economics, IMF International Financial Statis-
tics, Eurostat, iAGS calculations
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STB targets are generally positive. This is due to three points. First a positive
and stable NIIP needs a positive STB insofar as the gap between the potential
growth rate and the real interest rate is positive. Second, a higher real interest rate
than the potential growth rate implies NIIP and STB with reverse signs, which is
the case for Italy here. Third, the gap between the current account and the trade
balance (revenues and current transfers in % of GDP) is assumed to be constant in
the long run and has then to be compensated by a higher or lower STB. This last
point is for instance very important for Ireland.
We now analyse more carefully the gap between the STB and its target in
Table 2. Results show that situations differ from one country to another. Some
countries need to strongly increase their STB to achieve the target. This is the case
when the last column of Table 2 reports a positive TB gap. It concerns first and
foremost Greece: a strong improvement in Greek competitiveness is needed to
improve its trade balance in the long run and stabilise the NIIP. Finland, France,
Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain are concerned to a lesser extent. Conversely,
Germany and the Netherlands, which already have the highest NIIP, should
reduce their STB, since the current ones imply ever increasing NIIP. 
To a certain extent, these results come from the countries’ responses to the
crisis. Column 10 in Table 2 shows the evolution of STB between 2008 and 2013.
This provides a way to gauge the effort made by EA countries to reduce external
disequilibria since the start of the crisis. Four country groups emerge. The first one
consists of Spain, France, Belgium and Austria who have made a part of the adjust-
ment. These countries have completed about 60% of the required adjustment
(90% for Spain). The second one refers to countries (Portugal, Finland and Italy)
that were in excess STB before the crisis and the hit from the crisis has resulted in a
decreasing NIIP, i.e. a too low STB. The crisis has brought these countries in the red
zone. The third group includes Ireland and the Netherlands, who have increased
Table 2. Structural trade balance adjustment since 2008
% of GDP
Structural trade balance Structural trade 
balance target
Variation
2008-2013
Trade balance 
gap2008 2013
(9) (7) (8) (10) = (7) – (9) (11) = (8) – (7)
AUT 6.1 2.8 1.0 -3.3 -1.8
BEL -1.6 0.7 2.2 2.3 1.6
FIN 5.8 -0.8 1.5 -6.6 2.3
FRA -4.3 -1.7 0.0 2.6 1.6
DEU 7.0 8.3 -1.2 1.3 -9.5
GRC -2.6 -11.4 -1.5 -8.8 9.8
IRL -7.3 17.0 15.6 24.3 -1.4
ITA 10.5 -0.8 1.6 -11.3 2.4
NLD -1.3 8.5 0.1 9.8 -8.5
PRT 10.1 -2.6 0.5 -12.7 3.1
ESP -11.6 0.3 1.3 11.9 1.0
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook 95, IMF WEO October 2014, Oxford Economics, IMF International Financial Statis-
tics, Eurostat, iAGS calculations.
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their STB too much and have overshot the target. Finally, during the crisis
Germany and Greece increased imbalances, but in opposite fashions. These two
countries are symmetrical in a sense: rapidly increasing NIIP for Germany and
rapidly decreasing NIIP for Greece, in structural terms. 
These results emphasize that the massive external trade surplus in Germany is
a concern for the EA, since without a German adjustment other countries cannot
adjust as well. First, a large NIIP for Germany can imply large negative NIIP for the
rest of the EA if the euro exchange rate is in a way sensitive to EA wide NIIP.
Second, increasing NIIP dynamics, even larger when STB is higher than current
TB, thus indicates a strong increase in NIIP is to be expected unless price adjust-
ment is done. 
The strong compression of internal demand in Greece has had no significant
effect on the competitiveness of the country until now. More generally, over-
shooting and increasing imbalances of seven countries out of eleven stresses that
macroeconomic policies conducted during the crisis have not been well-designed
to correct external imbalances among EA countries in the sense that they do not
favour stabilising NIIPs. 
Box 1. Computing structural trade balances
Structural trade balances can be computed by correcting trade balances from
the differentiated effects of business cycle among countries. The intuition is to
estimate trade balances with closed output gaps, while neglecting the effect of
relative prices adjustments, that is to say that we assume constant market
shares in the long run (this assumption is relaxed in the second part of the
chapter). 
Assume that the volume of exports xi of country i depends on the total
foreign demand diEX :
xi = diEX
Similarly, the volume of imports mi of country i depends on the domestic
output yi:
mi = yi
The long run volume of imports is equal to the potential domestic output
mι = yι. It follows that mι = mi – (yi – yι).
As bilateral trade imposes mij = xji we deduce:
where wxij is the share of country j in the exports of country i.
The structural trade balance is then STB = xι – mι = xi – mi +
= ∑ = ∑   and  = ∑  
( ) ∑  
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Correcting external imbalances since 2008
As shown in Table 2, some countries with a high STB in 2008, like Austria and
Finland, have decreased their surplus since the beginning of the crisis and coun-
tries with high deficits have reduced them (Ireland and Spain). Intra-EMU trade
figures also attest for decreasing imbalances (see Box 2). This tendency to the
rebalancing of current account imbalances has been supported by labour cost
developments, and for some authors, among them Buti and Turrini (2012)2,
wage adjustments have been one of the main drivers of the correction of external
imbalances. 
Before the inception of the crisis (2000-2007), nominal compensation per
employee grew faster in peripheral countries of the Eurozone (+3.6% annual
mean growth, Figure 2) than in core countries (+2.3%), generating a divergence
of competitiveness among Member States. This tendency has been reversed since
2010. Between 2010 and 2013, nominal compensation per employee has slowed
down very significantly in peripheral countries (+0.8%) while it has accelerated,
modestly, in core countries (+2.6%). 
As can be seen from Figure 3 and Table 3, the evolution of nominal wages is
heterogeneous among countries. The magnitude of wage moderation has been
closely linked with the extent of the slack in the labour market, as measured by
the increase in the unemployment rate. For example, in Greece, where the adjust-
ment of employment was extreme, nominal wages have decreased at an annual
2. See Buti and Turrini (2012). 
Figure 2. Evolution of nominal compensation per employee (total economy)
  Annual growth, in %
Note: peripheral countries group includes Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland and Greece. Core countries group
includes France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria and Finland. Within a group, national evolutions
are weighted according to their respective nominal GDP.
Sources: Ameco, iAGS calculations. 
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rate of 3.5% since 2010. Wage moderation was also pronounced in Ireland, Spain
and Italy. Since the crisis, nominal wages have stagnated in Ireland, contrasting
with their pre-crisis dynamism (+6.0% per year between 2000 and 2007), and a
similar pattern is observable in Spain (+0.7% average yearly growth since 2010,
contrasting with +3.7% before 2008). Wage growth has also moderated, but to a
lesser extent, in countries preserved from sovereign crisis, as can be seen in
France, Belgium, Austria and Finland. In a context of rising employment and
falling unemployment, the acceleration of German wages (+2.5% of average
yearly growth since 2010, compared to +1.0% between 2000 and 2007) consti-
tutes a noteworthy exception among euro area states.
However, macroeconomic data may underestimate the magnitude of the
process. The effects of the crisis were more severe among young and unskilled
workers, whose wages tend to be lower than the average. According to several
studies that use micro-data, composition effects have had a positive contribution
to average wages since the start of the crisis3, which is hidden in macro-data. This
is true in both core countries and peripheral ones.
Focusing exclusively on nominal wages might be incomplete in order to
assess the magnitude of the adjustment. In the presence of downward wage rigid-
ities, firms may adjust their wage bill by cutting jobs. According to the “Wage
Dynamics Network” survey made by ECB4, this was precisely the main strategy
3. See for example, ECB (2012) which focuses on the start of the crisis. For the Spanish case see
Puente et Galan (2014) and Verdugo (2013) for the French case.
Table 3. Nominal compensation per employee (total economy)
In %
2000-2007 2008-2009 2010-2013
Core countries 2.3 2.1 2.6
FRA 2.8 2.2 2.4
DEU 1.0 1.2 2.5
NLD 3.5 3.2 1.9
BEL 2.8 2.4 2.6
AUT 2.5 2.8 2.0
FIN 3.1 3.1 2.7
Peripheral countries 3.6 3.8 0.8
ESP 3.7 5.6 0.7
ITA 3.0 2.9 1.5
IRL 6.0 2.1 0.0
PRT 3.8 2.5 0.4
GRC 5.9 3.3 -3.5
EA 2.6 2.7 2.0
Sources: Ameco, iAGS calculations.
4. For a summary of the results, see Lamo (2013). Firms that answered the survey come from 9 EU
countries: Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria and Poland.
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used by firms. Two thirds of firms reacted to the demand shock associated with
the start of the crisis by cutting costs5 and among those firms, 66% did it by
reducing labour costs despite the inability to cut wages6. Hence, 24% of firms
reduced the number of temporary employees, 17% permanent employees and
14% decreased the number of hours worked. 
Unit labour costs (ULC) measure the labour cost per unit of added value,
which is a better indicator of labour cost adjustment as it takes into account simul-
taneously the dynamics of nominal compensation per employee and the one of
employment through its accounting impact on productivity. 
Between 2000 and 2007, important divergences contributed to the emer-
gence of external imbalances. Euro area ULC increased by 12 points during this
period—rather less than the increase in consumer prices—but this figure masks
heterogeneity across Member States. Before the crisis, ULC increased significantly
in peripheral countries as Ireland (+40 points), Spain (+28), Italy (+23) or Portugal
(+20). The evolution was close to the euro area mean in France (+17), Belgium
(+14) and the Netherlands (+17). Finally, ULC growth was moderate in surplus
countries like Austria (+5) and even decreased in Germany (-4).
As discussed in the 2014 iAGS Report, since the start of the crisis ULCs have
adjusted but very asymmetrically. The trends identified in last year’s report
continue. The crisis countries (except Italy) have all by now (Figure 4 includes the
5. This share reached 78% if the shock was judged to be strong and to 94% if it was coupled with
credit constraints.
6. Only 1% of firms declare a decrease of base wages and 10% of firms a cut on flexible wages.
Figure 3. Evolution of unemployment rate and nominal compensation per employee
Sources: iAGS calculations on Ameco data.
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first two quarters of 2014 for most countries) adjusted so as to return to the trajec-
tory of average ULC growth in the currency union (+24 points between 2000 and
Q2 2014). Nevertheless, a positive gap persists in Italy (+34 over the same period),
Belgium (+33) and France (+29). Although German ULC started to increase after
the crisis, it has only increased by 9% since Q1 2000, which remains 15 points
below the average of the Eurozone. In interpreting these figures it is important to
recognise that the EA average ULC increase has lagged behind the benchmark
given by the target inflation rate of the ECB.7 A ULC increase in line with this
target (1.9% a year) would amount to over 30% between 2000 and 2014. 
As it can be seen in Figure 5, all of the crisis countries except Italy actually
achieved negative ULC growth between 2008 and 2012. For some countries the
cut in ULC is very significant as in Ireland (-19%) or Spain (-6%). While the period
following the crisis is characterized by nominal compensation moderation, most
of the decrease of ULC in deficit countries can be explained by the surge of labour
productivity (Figure 5): employment adjustment was higher than the output drop
which translates into an observed rise of productivity that, for given labour costs,
results in the increase of firms’ profitability. 
On the other hand, Germany has experienced a ULC growth since the crisis
(+12%), that contrasts with the decrease observed before. Since 2008, its ULC
growth rates have been broadly in line with the EMU average (+10%): in other
words, while it is no longer opening up a competitiveness gap vis-à-vis the other
EMU countries, neither is it closing the accumulated gap that had built up in
previous years. Nominal compensation accelerated in Germany in 2012, but this
momentum was not maintained, the rate weakening in 2013 and improving only
slightly in 2014 (Herzog-Stein and al., 2014). Meanwhile labour productivity still
grows faster than the euro area average. Austria, by contrast, has been steadily
closing the gap with the EMU average from below, offering an example of
successful symmetrical adjustment. 
7. See e.g. Watt (2007).
Figure 4. Unit labour costs (total economy)
Q12000 = 100
Sources: iAGS calculations on Eurostat data.
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If the evolution of ULC seems to support the rebalancing of current accounts in
the euro area (with the notable exceptions of Italy and Germany), the analysis of
cost-competitiveness needs to compare the relative labour cost adjustment with
respect to the evolution of the labour cost of competitors. The simultaneity of the
adjustment reduces the amplitude of relative cost adjustments in many countries.
Even in Ireland (which reduced ULC by -31%), the relative ULC (Figure 6) gains
with respect to competitors based in the rest of the euro area are lower, although
they remain significant (-20%). A similar effect is observable in some countries of
Eastern Europe (like Slovenia) where labour costs reductions offset each other.
Among big countries only Spain has improved its cost-competiveness signifi-
cantly. This is explained not only by the decrease of domestic ULC (by 6 points
since 2008), but also because its principal partners, most of them in core countries,
have increased, even if moderately, their own labour costs (Figure 7). At the end
the Spanish relative ULC decreased by 14 points. On the other side, French and
Italian competitiveness have not deteriorated significantly since 2008 in spite of the
fact that their nominal ULC have remained relatively dynamic, thanks to the persis-
tence of wage dynamics in other core countries, like Germany after 2009.
While recent labour market developments seem to support the correction of
imbalances, their impact should not be overstated. EA countries have made a lot
of efforts to compress ULC since 2008. But these efforts do not spread automati-
cally into export prices as firms may restore margins instead of decreasing prices,
particularly in a context where firms have restricted access to bank loans and
suffer from damaged balance sheet after the hit of the crisis. Significant diver-
gences can arise between relative export prices and labour costs. Since 2008, in
spite of an impressive reduction in relative labour costs, export prices of goods
and services have risen in Ireland (+3.9%) and Greece (+6.3%) and remained
unchanged in Spain (Figure 8). Otherwise, the relative export price has decreased
Figure 5. Determinants of Unit labour costs evolution (total economy)
  Percentage change since Q1 2008
Sources: iAGS calculations on Eurostat data.
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in Finland (-4.9%) while it was the country with the highest relative ULC growth
(Herzog-Stein and al., 2014).   
Figure 6. Relative ULC (country ULC / competitors average ULC) within EMU
Percentage change since Q1 2008
Note: the competitors average ULC corresponds to the geometric mean of the reference competitors (here
Eurozone countries) weighted by a double weighting scheme that takes into account the bilateral intensity
of competition in each market.
Sources: iAGS calculations on DG Ecfin data. 
Figure 7. Evolution of relative ULC
Sources: iAGS calculations on Eurostat and European Commission data.
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Once one restricts the comparison to the export price of goods and the
competitor group is extended to euro area countries, the relative export price
decreases in most euro area countries, pointing to the role of exchange rates
in the assessment of price-competitiveness. Only Belgium (-5.1%) and Greece
(-6.0%) have lost price-competitiveness with respect to this broader group. 
It is important to signal that the gap between labour cost developments and
export prices may reflect some statistical bias: while ULC are computed for all
firms in the economy, which have adjusted severely in many countries, export
prices are, by definition, set by the group of exporters. It is now well known that
the bulk of foreign sales are concentrated among relatively few exporters. Those
firms, which have been called “the happy few”8, tend to be more productive,
produce higher quality products, are more profitable and have a better financial
situation. The crisis hit particularly small firms of which many had to close, while
the “happy few” have better resisted to the shock. This selection mechanism
favours big firms with advantages in terms of quality and reputation that are able
to set higher prices. On the other hand, small firms shut down and stop
exporting. Hence, the average export price may rise while the firm-level export
price may decrease in line with costs developments.
The gap between ULC and export prices may also suggest that firms are
“pricing to market”: irrespective of changes in their labour costs of production
they sell goods on foreign markets in line with price trends on those precise
markets. The adjustment variable is the firm margin and profitability, suggesting
that exporters may be restoring margins that had been squeezed in the pre-crisis
period. Even so, the gap between ULC and export price developments suggest
that export growth could have been stronger if price rises had been restrained. 
While labour market dynamics might contribute to the correction of imbal-
ances in euro area, the social and economic costs of this strategy seem too high.
The ULC decrease in crisis countries is explained mostly by the rise of productivity
which is linked to a massive surge of the unemployment rate (See chapter 1). By
September 2014, unemployment had increased by more than 7 million people
since the start of the crisis. Unemployment has decreased at a moderate pace
lately, but the scars of the “Great Recession” will last. First, the impact of the
unemployment gap on wage negotiations will last, as a Phillips curve analysis
suggests. Second, this kind of adjustment transfers revenues from workers—and,
among them, the most vulnerable with higher propensity to consume—to firms.
In a context of low investment, this transfer will weigh on aggregate demand.
Third, the ULC reductions have not been sufficiently offset by higher ULC and
price inflation in Germany. Together, these developments increase deflation risks,
notably in peripheral countries, in a period where private and public actors are
seeking to repair their balance sheets. The wage deflationary pressures will
then continue and may even strengthen if expectations re-anchor to a defla-
tionary equilibrium. 
8. See Mayer and Ottaviano (2007).
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Box 2. Adjustments of euro area countries regarding Germany
Another way to assess the correction of imbalances is to look at bilateral trade
between EA countries (Figure 9). So we consider Bundesbank data for the bilat-
eral trade and payments relations between Germany–the largest economy and
by far the most important surplus country in the currency area–and ten other
EA countries including the biggest ones (France, Italy, Spain) and crisis coun-
tries (Ireland, Greece, Portugal). The figures are reported from the German
position, so that the line representing “Exports” to, for instance, Spain repre-
sents Spanish imports of goods and services from Germany. Overall, the
German trade surplus vis-à-vis other EA countries vanished in 2013. Germany
has maintained a current account surplus throughout the period since the crisis
with all the other countries except Ireland and Netherlands. But the current
account surpluses have fallen substantially, and Germany is now in deficit with
Spain in 2013. 
If we consider the developments of exports and imports separately, a similar
pattern emerges as evidenced for post-crisis trade relations more generally.
Initially the trade deficits were closed primarily by import compression. More
recently, though, exports from the crisis countries to Germany have picked up
somewhat. As a combined result of these two trends, the German trade
surpluses are now very limited in most cases (except for France). The fact that
the current account deficit remains considerably wider is due to the other
components of the current account (factor income and transfers) which have
tended to remain rather stable in the years since the crisis broke. This means
that, despite the improvement in bilateral trade balances with Germany, the
crisis countries still have to fund current account deficits, which implies further
increasing their net foreign liabilities vis-a-vis Germany.
Figure 8. Variation of the relative export price of merchandises
Average price of competitors / country price. 2008Q1 – 2013Q4
Note: Relative ULC (export-price) is computed as the ratio between ULC (export-price) in the country over
the average ULC (export-price) of its competitors (weighted by a double weighting that measures the
intensity of competition in world markets).
Sources: iAGS calculations based on DG Ecfin data.
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
IRL GRC ESP PRT JPN GBR DNK SWE FRA ITA NLD BEL USA AUT CAN DEU MEX FIN
Relative ULC (total economy; Euro area)
Relative Export price (goods & services; Euro area)
Relative Export price (goods & services; 37 countries)
Relative Export price (goods; world)
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report178
Figure 9. Bilateral trade (Goods and services) of EA countries with Germany
Millions of euros
Sources: Bundesbank, iAGS calculations.
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Greater import absorption by Germany on the back of expansionary policies
and measures to increase wage and price growth would have reduced the costs
of adjustment and the crisis countries would already certainly be running trade
surpluses and probably also current account surpluses against Germany,
enabling them to pay down foreign debt. It is not too late to rectify this costly
error. A corollary of shrinking bilateral current account surpluses with the EMU
crisis countries is that the continued German current account surpluses of
between 6 and 7% of GDP are due to growing net exports in trade with non-
EMU countries, for instance the US and the BRICS.
2. Correcting external imbalances in the euro area
In order to perform a more systematic and globally consistent analysis of
imbalances in the EA, we construct a small trade model that computes the
required price adjustment of every EA country. Those price adjustments are by
construction compatible with both an internal rebalancing–closing the output
gap–and an external rebalancing–stabilizing the net international investment
position (NIIP) at a sustainable level.
The core of the model consists of equations linking import and export
volumes to output variations and to competitors’ prices.9 Imports react positively
to domestic activity and to domestic prices, and negatively to competitors’ prices.
Exports react positively to foreign activity levels and to competitors’ prices, and
negatively to domestic export prices. The model also incorporates equations for
export and import prices in order to reflect the pricing strategies (in the space
between local currency pricing on one extreme and producer currency pricing on
the other extreme). A detailed description of the model and its calibration are
given in the technical appendix.
The main contribution of this modeling exercise relative to previous studies is
that a global equilibrium is computed at the EA level. Instead of computing partial
equilibrium price adjustments, i.e. those needed in one country without taking
into account the effect of domestic price changes on the equilibrium of other
countries, our methodology computes price adjustments that are compatible with
internal and external adjustment of all EA countries simultaneously. Said otherwise,
we compute the equilibrium that should be reached if all EA countries were acting
cooperatively. The rest of the world is assumed to adjust its demand for imports
according to its activity level and to the EA export prices, but to keep its own
prices unchanged.
Defining the target of the external adjustment of EA countries is the critical
task.10 Even though it is clear that an ever increasing external position is unsus-
tainable over the long run, and that stabilizing the NIIP is therefore a necessary
condition, the level at which that position becomes unsustainable is not clearly
quantified in the literature and may depend on a wide range of parameters. In our
baseline scenario, we somewhat arbitrarily assume that NIIPs are sustainable over
9. See the technical appendix for more details.
10. On the other hand, the target of the internal adjustment is naturally defined as closing the
output gap.
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report180
the long run provided they are within the ±50% range of GDP (the sensitivity to
that parameter is studied in alternative scenarios further below). Therefore, for
those countries whose NIIP is already within ±50%, the target of their external
adjustment is simply to stabilize their NIIP at its current level. For those countries
whose NIIP is below -50% (resp. above +50%), their target is to stabilize their NIIP
at -50% (resp. +50%) at a 20-year horizon.
Table 4 summarizes the baseline scenario. The first column presents the NIIP
targets. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are expected to improve their NIIP
and reach the -50% level, while other countries are simply expected to stabilize
their NIIP at its current level. The last two columns present the results in terms of
real effective exchange rate (REER) adjustments and in terms of value added (VA)
price adjustments. Note that VA price adjustments and REER adjustments differ
precisely because all the countries are supposed to change their VA prices simulta-
neously: the REER incorporates changes in domestic prices but also changes in
prices of multiple trade partners. All the adjustments are computed using the data
available at the end of 2013, and therefore represent what remains to be done as
of the beginning of 2014. In the baseline, export prices of countries outside the
EA are supposed to remain constant in Euro terms. The computed adjustments are
such that, if implemented immediately, all the countries would reach their
NIIP targets in 20 years from now. The prescribed adjustments cannot be
achieved instantly but will be gradually implemented, so our results in terms of VA
prices should rather be understood as cumulative inflation differentials.11 For
example, according to Table 4, Germany should increase its prices by 26.1%
while Greece should decrease them by 6.9%, corresponding to a cumulative infla-
tion differential of 33%, so the adjustment could be achieved in 20 years with an
annual inflation differential of 1.65% between Germany and Greece.12
We now discuss the results in terms of REER adjustments. Unsurprisingly,
Germany and the Netherlands need a substantial real appreciation. Greece, on
the other hand, still needs to depreciate by almost 14% despite having already
reached a balanced current account because its recent current account impro-
vement has a strong cyclical component, related to the compression of its
internal demand. The other crisis countries (Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal) have
already mostly completed their adjustment. Looking at the results in terms of VA
prices, the model predicts moderate negative price adjustments for only three
countries: Belgium, Finland and Greece, and substantial positive price adjust-
ments in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. Given that these figures should
be understood as deviations relatively to a global inflation trend, our results indi-
cate that deflation is no more needed–even in crisis countries–in order to
11. More precisely, price adjustments should be understood as cumulative inflation differentials
relatively to the average inflation rate in the EA. When we say in Table 4 that Germany should
increase its prices by 26.1%, we mean that the adjustment will be over when the cumulative
inflation differential between Germany and the EA average reaches 26.1%. In the baseline, we also
suppose that prices of countries outside the EA (expressed in Euro terms) increase at the same rate as
the average EA inflation (i.e. we suppose that the relative purchasing power parity holds). This
assumption will be relaxed when we examine changes in the Euro exchange rate.
12. If price adjustments are not done immediately but are gradually implemented over time, then
the NIIP will not reach its target in 20 years, but later. How much later depends on the speed and
profile of the adjustment. We abstract from these short term dynamics and maintain the focus on
long term equilibria.
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achieve the adjustment; only inflation lower than the EA average is required.
Most of the adjustment should now go through inflation rates above the
average in surplus countries.
Since the model predicts price increases in most EA countries and since our
baseline scenario assumes unchanged price levels outside the EA, the model
predicts a loss of competitiveness of the EA as a whole and therefore a deteriora-
tion of its trade balance (of 2.8% of GDP, down to 0.8%). This result stems from
the chosen NIIP country targets which sum up to an almost zero aggregate NIIP
for the whole EA. As a consequence the model targets an almost balanced current
account at the EA level, and therefore predicts a deterioration of the aggregate
trade balance. Alternative scenarios with respect to the exterior position of the EA
are analyzed further below.
We explored the sensitivity of our results to various hypotheses: the degree of
internal rebalancing, the nominal depreciation of the Euro, the real interest rate,
the adjustment horizon and the NIIP target range. The main conclusion is that the
general picture given by the baseline results is robust, while other interesting
features emerge.
First, if price adjustments are computed without assuming that output gaps
are closed, then the results are broadly similar except for Greece, for the reasons
mentioned above: instead of a real depreciation of 13.7%, the country would
need an appreciation of 11.9% in the absence of internal rebalancing; the same
applies to a lesser extent to Ireland, which would need an appreciation of 19.8%
instead of 5.6% (because of its large output gap of -8.7%).
We also performed simulations in which the nominal effective exchange rate
of the Euro is allowed to change (but export prices of countries outside the EA are
still kept unchanged in foreign currency terms). The result is that REER adjust-
ments are insensitive to changes in the nominal effective exchange rate of the
Table 4. Baseline scenario
In %
NIIP target (% GDP) REER adjustment VA price adjustment
AUT 0.5 +14.9 +26.6
BEL 45.8 -16.1 -6.0
FIN 15.8 -14.3 -8.6
FRA -17.0 -4.5 +2.7
DEU 48.4 +21.8 +26.1
GRC -50.0 -13.7 -6.9
IRL -50.0 +5.6 +9.6
ITA -29.5 +5.8 +12.3
NLD 46.3 +19.5 +25.0
PRT -50.0 -3.2 +5.4
ESP -50.0 +2.9 +9.7
If Greece is to reach a NIIP of -50% of GDP in 20 years from now, it must achieve a real depreciation of 13.7%. 
This can be obtained by decreasing its VA prices by 6.9% (assuming that the other EA countries also adjust their 
VA prices by the prescribed amounts and that prices outside the EA are unchanged).
Source: iAGS calculations.
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Euro. The intuition for this result is that long term equilibria in real variables are
invariant to nominal variables (and we do not incorporate short term adjustment
dynamics). However, adjustments expressed in terms of VA prices are affected by
the nominal exchange rate, on a one-to-one basis. For example, under the
hypothesis of nominal depreciation of the Euro of 10%, all internal prices must
increase by 10% more than in the baseline scenario. In particular, this means that
in the 10% depreciation scenario, no negative price adjustment is needed (even
relative to the common inflation trend).
The results are not very sensitive to the value assumed for the real interest rate
on foreign assets, which is 1% in the baseline.13 Again, Greece is the exception
with a required REER adjustment ranging from -22.3% (in case of a negative real
interest rate of -1.5%) to -7.7% (for a real interest rate of 3%).
We also tested the sensitivity of our results to the horizon at which the NIIP is
assumed to reach its target position. In the baseline, this horizon is set at 20 years,
which means that the target NIIP will be reached in 20 years if the countries
adjust immediately to the new internal prices and maintain that price level over
the next 20 years. Shortening or extending the adjustment horizon significantly
changes the adjustment required from those countries which are not already
within the required NIIP range (±50%), i.e. Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal.
The impact on other countries in terms of REER adjustment is small, but not zero,
because of general equilibrium effects. Results for this exercise are reported in
Table 5. The main point to be stressed is that, if we leave them 50 years or even
more to adjust, then Greece and Portugal no longer need a real depreciation in
order to reach equilibrium (as was already the case of Italy, Spain and Ireland in
the 20 years baseline).
13. In our simulations it is necessary to make an assumption for the real interest rate on foreign
assets in order to make the transition from trade balances to current accounts (and the latter is then
used for computing the NIIP). See the technical appendix for more details.
Table 5. REER adjustments as a function of the adjustment horizon
In %
Horizon 10 years 20 years 50 years Infinite
AUT +14.2 +14.9 +15.3 +15.5
BEL -16.9 -16.1 -15.6 -15.3
FIN -15.5 -14.3 -13.7 -13.3
FRA -4.3 -4.5 -4.7 -4.7
DEU +21.8 +21.8 +21.8 +21.8
GRC -43.7 -13.7 +4.3 +14.8
IRL -0.8 +5.6 +9.4 +11.4
ITA +5.7 +5.8 +5.8 +5.9
NLD +19.1 +19.5 +19.7 +19.8
PRT -17.4 -3.2 +5.3 +10.1
ESP -5.4 +2.9 +7.9 +10.6
Source: iAGS calculations.
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Finally, we examine the influence of the target range for NIIP, which is ±50%
in the benchmark. Table 6 shows the results. On one end if we impose a return to
a zero NIIP for all countries, then the crisis countries–which currently have highly
negative NIIP–must depreciate much more than in the baseline, while the adjust-
ment required for other countries is mostly unchanged.14 On the other end, if the
upper limit on the absolute NIIP is lifted–and therefore if the only constraint is to
stabilize the NIIP at its current level–then no crisis country needs to depreciate.15
Simulations with the range ±25% give result close to those obtained with a lower
bound of -35% as it is set in the six pack scoreboard. 
The last two sensitivity exercises have shown that, for the countries with a
very negative NIIP (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain), the adjustment could be
made easier or even avoided if the constraints were relaxed (either in terms of
adjustment horizon or of NIIP target). Another way of relaxing the constraints
would be to introduce some external debt relief, which could be achieved
through a public debt relief. Though we did not quantify this possibility, it is clear
that it would translate into a smaller relative price adjustment for these countries.
So far we have presented the adjustments needed as of early 2014. But it is
possible to apply the same methodology to past data and therefore to reconstruct
the evolution over time of the internal disequilibria of the EA. We performed this
exercise for all years between 1995 and 2013 (implicitly considering the Ecu as
the single currency before 1999). Some clear historical patterns emerge from this
exercise. Germany starts from an overvaluation of about 10% in 1995 and then
14. The depreciation required for Belgium and Finland is smaller in that case than in the baseline,
because those countries currently have a positive NIIP and a trade balance deficit. Sustaining a zero
NIIP requires less effort than sustaining a positive NIIP.
15. The results for this case are similar to the results with a very large time horizon to adjust. Having
a lot of time to adjust means letting the NIIP drift very slowly, which in the medium term is almost
the same as stabilizing the NIIP.
Table 6. REER adjustments as a function of the NIIP target range
In %
NIIP target range 0% ±25% ±50% ±100% No range limit
AUT +14.8 +14.8 +14.9 +15.5 +15.6
BEL -3.9 -10.1 -16.1 -15.3 -15.2
FIN -7.3 -14.1 -14.3 -13.2 -13.1
FRA -9.9 -4.9 -4.5 -4.7 -4.8
DEU +28.9 +25.2 +21.8 +21.8 +21.8
GRC -34.9 -24.5 -13.7 +8.6 +17.8
IRL -0.0 +3.1 +5.6 +12.0 +12.6
ITA -4.0 +4.1 +5.8 +5.9 +5.9
NLD +23.7 +21.6 +19.5 +19.8 +19.8
PRT -13.8 -8.6 -3.2 +7.4 +11.8
ESP -6.4 -2.0 +2.9 +12.0 +11.9
Source: iAGS calculations.
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sharply reverses its position in the early 2000s to arrive at an undervaluation of
21% in 2007, which has mostly remained constant since. The Netherlands exhibit
a fairly stable pattern of undervaluation oscillating between 10% and 20% during
the whole sample. France starts from an equilibrium position in 1995, quickly
becomes undervalued by 20% by 1999, then gradually loses its competitive
advantage to arrive at a small overvaluation today. Portugal and Greece were
overvalued during the whole sample, with a worsening of their situation during
the financial crisis, followed by a marked improvement between 2011 and 2013.
Spain qualitatively follows a similar pattern, but with a quantitatively smaller
overvaluation.
In all the exercises above, the target of the adjustment has been defined in
terms of stabilizing the NIIP at its current level, or as an effort to bring back the
NIIP into a sustainable range if needed. But considering the adjustment under this
angle has some drawbacks. For example, some countries (Belgium and Finland)
today have current account deficits but a positive NIIP. Stabilizing their NIIP at its
current level means turning their current account deficit into a surplus. But one
could argue that shrinking the deficit down to a level compatible with a negative
—but sustainable—NIIP would constitute an acceptable adjustment, which actu-
ally happens to be more sensible because less painful. This observation led us to
consider another type of global EA readjustment in which the price adjustments
are minimized, under the constraint that all NIIPs are stabilized in a sustainable
range over a given horizon. More precisely, we computed the vector of price
adjustments that minimizes the quadratic sum of price deviations weighted by
country GDPs, under the constraint that all NIIPs converge in the range of ±50%
of GDP within 20 years. Table 7 shows the results. The optimal NIIP targets are
different from those of the baseline; in particular, only Greece will reach the lower
bound of -50%, while three countries—Austria, Germany and the Netherlands—
will reach the upper bound of +50%. 
Turning to REER adjustments and VA price adjustments, one can see that
the magnitude of bilateral readjustments is globally the same as in the baseline,
but with a lower average price level (i.e. this scenario requires a lower average
Table 7. Alternative scenario: Minimization of price deviations
In %
Long-term NIIP(% GDP) REER adjustment VA price adjustment
AUT 50.0 +2.1 +5.8
BEL 37.4 -14.8 -9.2
FIN -5.5 -6.8 -3.7
FRA -5.4 -7.2 -4.6
DEU 50.0 +22.2 +22.2
GRC -50.0 -13.6 -11.1
IRL 50.0 -7.5 -5.6
ITA 8.0 -6.1 -3.2
NLD 50.0 +17.9 +20.1
PRT -32.8 -5.6 -4.1
ESP 6.9 -7.3 -5.2
Source: iAGS calculations.
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inflation in the EA). The baseline was biased towards inflation because it was
based on a shrinking of the current account surplus of the EA, itself needed
because the aggregate NIIP target of the EA was close to zero; in this alternative
scenario where price deviations are minimized, the average price deviation is
close to zero, and therefore the aggregate trade balance shrinks by less (it shrinks
by 1.8% of GDP, down to 1.7%).
The last scenario that we examined is also based on a minimization of the
price deviations, but under the additional constraint that the REER of the whole EA
should remain unchanged. The results are reported in Table 8. The general picture
is that this scenario calls for even less inflation on average, especially for France
and Italy which are additionally asked a much larger devaluation relatively to
Germany. The consequence is that the aggregate trade balance is shrunk by only
1.3% of GDP, down to 2.2%. Note that this scenario still predicts a degradation of
the trade balance–even though the real exchange rate of the EA is kept constant–
because the EA has a larger output gap than the rest of the world at the end of
2013 and will therefore import relatively more when output gaps are closed.
Of course this exercise has its limitations. It is based on a crude model of the
trade behaviours of EA countries, and it abstracts from many important issues:
short and medium term dynamics, non-price competitiveness, sectoral disaggre-
gation, valuation effects on the NIIP, feedback effects on the rest of the world. In
particular, a Euro depreciation should further reduce the adjustment because of
the expected positive valuation effects on the NIIP.16 Further effort is therefore
needed to obtain more precise estimates of the disequilibria within the EA. We
nevertheless believe that our estimates provide a good starting point and are
useful enough to draw some policy conclusions.
Table 8. Alternative scenario: Minimization of price deviations, 
under stable aggregate REER
In %
Long-term NIIP (% GDP) REER adjustment VA price adjustment
AUT 50.0 -2.8 +3.0
BEL 3.6 -7.2 -4.7
FIN -15.5 -3.4 -1.5
FRA 34.9 -18.9 -17.3
DEU 50.0 +21.9 +20.1
GRC -50.0 -13.5 -13.1
IRL -10.2 -1.8 -0.9
ITA 25.8 -12.1 -11.2
NLD 50.0 +16.6 +17.8
PRT -50.0 -1.3 -2.8
ESP 10.6 -7.3 -8.5
Source: iAGS calculations.
16. See for example Pupetto L. and Sode A. (2012).
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The main conclusions can be summarized as follows. First, even though a
substantial readjustment has been achieved since 2011, much still remains to be
done. The price disequilibria between overvalued and undervalued countries
within the EA could be as much as 35% under reasonable assumptions. Secondly,
a rebalancing strategy should rely on maintaining inflation differentials within the
EA over an extended period, with higher inflation in Germany and lower inflation
in crisis countries; deflation is not required in the latter countries if the readjust-
ment is implemented gradually. A coordinated wage policy, with substantial
wage increases in Germany, would definitely be needed in order to achieve the
rebalancing while limiting adjustment costs. Third, a nominal depreciation of the
Euro would facilitate the rebalancing by making it compatible with a higher infla-
tion rate even in crisis countries. Fourth, public debt relief in some countries–at
least in the smaller crisis countries like Portugal, Greece and Ireland–would also
ease the adjustment.
This year's iAGS report does not contain a detailed analysis of wage policy. We
refer readers to last year's report, in which a coordinated setting of minimum
wage increases in accordance with macroeconomic considerations in each
country was shown to have a significant potential in achieving balanced adjust-
ment of competitiveness within the euro area without imposing the high costs
associated with deflationary policies.
More generally, the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure offers, in prin-
ciple, an opportunity to reach a “grand bargain” centred around a golden wage
rule.17 This would increase the capacity of social partners and governments to
deliver balanced wage outcomes that respect the need for growth and competi-
tiveness while avoiding a dangerous race to the bottom. This requires, rather than
the destruction of collective bargaining institutions, on the contrary, joint national
and European initiatives to develop the institutional capacity for wage setting that
takes macroeconomic outcomes as a firm basis for outcomes.
17. See Watt, A. (2012).
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Technical appendix
The model
The first step is, for given NIIP targets, to compute the corresponding trade
balance targets. Let i denote the country index, TBi the trade balance to GDP
ratio of country i, CAi the current account to GDP ratio, NIIPi the NIIP to GDP
ratio, r the real interest rate, π the inflation rate. We compute the part of the
current account Ri (expressed as a ratio of GDP) that is not explained by trade or
by interest payments on the external position:
Ri = CAi – TBi – (r + π)NIIPi
That residual is non zero either because of transfers (remittances, debt cancel-
lation…), errors and omissions, or because the assumed interest rate r does not
correspond to the effective average interest rate on the net external position.
Then, given potential growth gi, the adjustment horizon h and the NIIP target
NIIPι , the target trade balance is defined by:
This target trade balance is such that, if the country were adjusting to this
new value today, then the NIIP would reach the target NIIP in h years, provided
the hypotheses on growth, real interest rate and inflation are realized.
It is important to note that this calculation incorporates several other assump-
tions. First, the residual Ri is assumed constant over time; as a side effect, if the
value that we assumed for r is wrong, then our interest payment computations are
wrong only on the difference between the initial NIIP and its target. Second, we
assume that changes in the NIIP are only due to current account surpluses or defi-
cits and not to valuation effects: this seems like a reasonable approximation since
there is no time pattern or trend in those valuation effects over time (see Pupetto
and Sode, 2012, p. 30 for more details).
We now describe the trade model that is at the core of the computation. All
the endogenous variables denoted by lower letters are log-deviations from a refer-
ence level (defined as the actual values at the end of 2013).
The volume of exports xi of country i depends on the foreign demand diEX
and on the difference between piEX, the index of competitors’ prices on export
markets of country i, and piX, the export prices of country i:
xi = diEX + εiX(piEX – piX)
where εiX is the price-elasticity of exports. Note that the elasticity of exports with
respect to the foreign demand is equal to one, which means that this is a specifi-
cation in terms of market shares.
Similarly, the volume of imports mi of country i depends on the domestic
output yi and on the difference between domestic VA prices piVA and import
prices piM:
mi = yi + εiM(piVA – piM)
=
∑
− R  
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report188
where εiM is the price-elasticity of imports. Again, the elasticity with respect to
demand is equal to one, which is necessary to ensure homogeneity.
The foreign demand diEX faced by country i is a function of import volumes of
trade partners and of the output of the rest of the world yRoW (the latter being a
proxy for the imports of the rest of the world):
where wxij is the share of country j in the exports of country i.
The price piX of exports of country i depends on domestic VA prices and on
competitors’ prices on export markets:
piX = (1 – εiPX)piVA + εiPX piEX
where εiPX is the price-elasticity to competitors’ prices. On one extreme if εiPX = 1
then the producers of country i entirely adjust to competitor’s prices, potentially
at the expense of their margins. On the other extreme if εiPX = 0 then the
producers focus exclusively on their margins, potentially at the expense of their
competitiveness.
Similarly the price piM of imports of country i depends on domestic VA prices
and on a price index piEM of exporters to country i:
piM = (1 – εiPM)piVA  + εiPM piEM
where εiPM is the price-elasticity to export prices. On one extreme if εiPM = 0 then
the exporters to country i entirely adjust to domestic prices, potentially at the
expense of their margins. On the other extreme if εiPM = 0 then the exporters
focus exclusively on their margins, potentially at the expense of their
competitiveness.
The index of competitors’ prices on export markets of country i is defined by:
where e is the nominal effective exchange rate of the Euro, and the weights wcij
are computed by double weighting. Note that we make here the assumption that
export prices (in foreign currency) of countries outside the Eurozone do not
change, so e can be understood as non-euro competitors’ price expressed in
euros.
The price index of exporters to country i is defined by:
where wmij is the share of country j in the imports of country i.
Given the changes in exports, imports, prices and output, one can infer the
percentage point variation in the trade balance ratio, which is given by:
The solution of the model is defined as a set of vectors
x,m,pVA,pX,pM,pEX,pEM,dEX satisfying the equations of the model, under the
constraint that the trade balances reach their target (i.e.  ΔTBi = (TBι) – TBi  for all
countries) and given the assumptions for the output changes and the exchange
rate (in the baseline, the output gaps are supposed to close, so the output
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changes y are set to the opposite of the 2013 output gaps, and the exchange rate
of the Euro is supposed to remain unchanged, so e = 0).
Finally, for a given solution of the model, one can compute the REER changes
for every country:
Note that again this calculation assumes that prices of countries outside the
euro area (expressed in foreign currencies) remain unchanged.
Calibration
The data for the 2013 NIIP, TB and CA come from Eurostat. The 2013 output
gaps come from the OECD database. The potential growth rates are the same as
those used for the iAGS model. The bilateral import and export shares come from
CEPII’s CHELEM database.
The inflation rate π is set at the ECB target of 2%. In the baseline, the real
interest rate r is 1% and the horizon h is 20 years.
Finally, Table 9 shows the values assumed for the price-elasticities of export
and import volumes and prices.I
Table 9. Price-elasticities of export and import volumes and prices
Elasticities εX εM εPX εPM
AUT 0.60 0.16 0.18 0.51
BEL 0.47 0.28 0.57 0.79
FIN 0.60 0.31 0.57 0.79
FRA 0.58 0.74 0.52 0.72
DEU 0.42 0.79 0.53 0.77
GRC 0.47 0.37 0.41 0.40
IRL 0.60 0.33 0.28 0.51
ITA 0.43 0.57 0.44 0.43
NLD 0.60 0.28 0.41 0.36
PRT 0.47 0.56 0.77 0.79
ESP 0.85 0.81 0.44 0.76
Sources: Ducoudré and Heyer (2014) for France, Germany, Italy and Spain. OECD (2005) for the other countries.
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